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1 Introduction
At its most basic, patent breadth determines how di¤erent a competing product must be in
order to avoid infringing on a patent that has already been granted. Narrower patents make it
easier for competitors to enter the market and thus reduce the protability of a given patent,
but benet consumers by making the market more competitive. The value of patent protection
provided by national patent laws will thus depend on the breadth of patent protection provided
as well as its length. Patent breadth is reected in patent laws in two ways: the size of the
innovative step that is required in order for a new product to receive a patent and the extent to
which an imitating product must di¤er from a patented product in order to avoid infringing on
the patent. ODonoghue et al (1998) refer to the former concept as leading patent breadth and
the latter as lagging patent breadth. The Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS)
agreement has made an e¤ort to harmonize the length of patent protection by setting minimum
patent lives for members of the World Trade Organization (WTO). However, the agreement
did not attempt to harmonize patent breadth across countries. Part of the reason is that the
implications of such harmonization remain poorly understood.
The purpose of this paper is to study the strategic interaction between national govern-
ments over how they set patent breadth, and to identify the potential gains from harmonization
of patent breadth across countries. Falvey and Foster (2006) explain how governments interact
strategically over patent breadth. Developed countries with many potential innovators have
tended to opt for relatively strong IPR (intellectual property rights) systems. With R&D spend-
ing concentrated in a handful of the worlds richest countries, genuinely innovative activities are
limited in most developed and developing countries. The majority of countries in the world have
taken a di¤erent approach, providing only weak IPR protection, if any, as a way of allowing rapid
di¤usion of knowledge through imitation as a signicant source of technological development.
We interpret the adoption of weak IPR protection by some governments, equivalently narrow
patent breadth, as a strategic response to the adoption of relatively strong IPR protection by
others. The strategic use of patent breadth can also be illustrated in the case of Japan, where
a narrow interpretation of patent breadth in both the leading and lagging dimensions was an
intentional development strategy (Maskus and McDaniel 1999). Our aim is to provide a frame-
work through which this kind of strategic interaction between governments over patent breadth
can be understood.
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The breadth of patent protection provided by a country depends on both the language
of the laws and the manner in which they are interpreted by courts. One manifestation of a
countrys choice of patent breadth is the extent to which it applies the doctrine of equivalents.
The doctrine of equivalents extends the protection from a patent beyond the literal claims in
the patent by allowing a patent holder to claim infringement if the competing product provides
essentially the same service or outcome. In the United States, the doctrine of equivalents has
evolved to a three pronged test in which infringement occurs if the process or product in question
(i) performs the same function (ii) in the same way (iii) to obtain the same result as that of the
patent holder.4 Ralston (2007) notes that while Germany has adopted patent breadth similar
to that of the US through its application of the doctrine of equivalents, Japan and the United
Kingdom have chosen a narrower patent breadth by not applying a doctrine of equivalents.
Instead, they have relied on a literal interpretation of the patent to determine when infringement
occurs.
These di¤erences in the application of the doctrine of equivalents are reected in the out-
comes of some patent infringement cases, where a claim of infringement may be upheld in a
country with broad patent protection but not in another country with narrower patent protec-
tion. A case in point is Improver Corporation v Remington (1990).5 Improver Corporation had
developed a depilatory device for women called the Epilady that used a helical spring to remove
unwanted hair. In light of the success of the Epilady, Remington entered the market with a
similar device that used a rubber rod in place of the helical spring. Improver Corporation then
sued Remington for infringement. The German court found that Remingtons product infringed
because the substitution of a rubber rod would have no material e¤ect on the way that the
product operated and that an expert in the eld would have recognized that the rubber rod
would have no material e¤ect. While the UK court agreed with these two points, it also found
that there was no infringement because an expert in the eld would have recognized from the
language in the patent that the helical spring was an essential part of the patent. By adding
this third requirement for a nding of equivalence, the UK patent system requires a more literal
interpretation of the claims in the patent which substantially narrows the protection to patent
holders.
Patent breadth in the US is limited by the requirement that the doctrine of equivalents
4Union Paper-Bag Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U. S. 120, 97 U. S. 125.
5The discussion in this section draws on Hatter (1994-5) and Bonitatibus (2001-2).
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be applied to each claim in the patent. For example, it was established in Abbott v Sandoz
that a patent to produce a product using a particular process is not infringed by a competitor
who produces the product using a di¤erent process (Macedo 2009). The di¤ering process is not
required to be superior to the process in the patent, but only required to be one that was not
contained in prior art. This provides room for imitators to compete with new products if they
can invent around the patent,developing an alternative process that does not infringe on the
existing patent. Thus, the manner in which a country applies the doctrine of equivalents has
implications for both leading and lagging patent breadth.
In our analysis of patent breadth, we consider a two country model in which two rms (one
in each country) are competing in a patent race to develop a new product. The loser must decide
whether or not to produce an imitationthat competes with the patented product (an option
that is available whether or not it participates in the patent race). We model patent breadth
along the lines of the seminal work of Klemperer (1990), who identies patent breadth as the
distancethat potential competitors must locate from the patented product. Products that are
a further distance from the patented product are less attractive to consumers, and thus have
a smaller impact on the prots of the patent holder. It will then be easier for a competitor to
innovate around a patent and take market share from the patent holder when the government
provides narrow patent protection. Moreover, an imitation that is at a given distance from the
patented product may infringe on a patent in a country where protection is relatively broad
but not in another country where it is narrower, as in the case of Improver Corporation v
Remington (1990) discussed above. The protability of the imitation depends on the patent
breadth in each country. The narrowest possible patent breadth will allow the imitating rm to
produce a product that is a perfect substitute for the innovation, whereas a very broad patent
will preclude entry by the imitator because the imitation is not valued at all by consumers.
Although in our model the e¤ect of patent breadth on prots of the patent holder is similar
to that of Klemperer, our analysis di¤ers in several important ways. Klemperer analyzes a closed
economy model, whereas we consider a two country model that highlights strategic interactions
between governments. We consider a single imitator, rather than a competitive fringe. To
capture the presence of entry barriers, we choose a market structure in which the potential
imitator has market power. We do this on the basis that in practice the number of rms capable
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of duplicating a product from the information available in a patent ling may be limited.6 Also,
the presence of large marketing costs may give rms with existing brand names a signicant
advantage over new entrants, even though the products are very similar.7 Finally, we treat the
patent length as exogenously given.8
As with the more familiar concept of patent length, the choice of patent breadth involves a
trade-o¤ to each government in terms of national welfare. Increasing patent breadth increases
the expected prot to a rm from innovation and thus makes it more likely that there is a
successful innovation that increases welfare. We capture the e¤ect of di¤erences in levels of
innovative ability across countries by allowing for di¤erences across countries in the probability
that the domestic rm wins the patent race. Our analysis reveals that the e¤ect on static
welfare from increasing patent breadth is not to monotonically decrease welfare in the duopoly
case. Making patents broader raises industry output and raises the innovators price, potentially
raising welfare, but it does so by shifting sales away from the innovator towards the imitator.
Since an imitators product is less attractive to consumers, this shift in sales results in an
ambiguous e¤ect on static welfare. It is this set of welfare e¤ects that drives the strategic
policy interactions between governments and explains why equilibrium outcomes are di¤erent
for patent breadth to those that arise from strategic interaction over patent length.
To highlight the role of a countrys stage of development (and hence its rms likelihood of
winning a patent race), we focus on two cases: a North-South model in which the Southern rm
has a zero probability of innovating and a North-North model where each countrys rm has
the same probability of successful innovation. Our results in the North-South model indicate
that the South will choose the minimum level of patent breadth required to ensure entry by the
innovating rm, whereas the North will choose the maximum level of breadth. This characteriza-
tion of equilibrium captures the strategic interaction between governments over patent breadth
described by Falvey and Foster (2006) above. Interestingly, we also show that harmonization of
patent breadth would reduce world welfare in the North-South case.
6Bond and Saggi (2014) note that in a number of cases where compulsory licenses have been issued for patented
drugs, the licensees have struggled to produce products of acceptable quality.
7This holds for the case of over-the-counter pain relief products, where brand name products continue to hold
signicant market shares even though patents have expired and the production processes are well known. In the
case of ibuprofen, for example, Advil holds more than 50% of the market.
8Since leading patent breadth will a¤ect the useful life of the product by a¤ecting the time at which the product
is replaced by a superior product, our analysis can also be interpreted as treating the leading patent breadth as
given.
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Our framework can also be used to understand why the extent of intellectual property
protection might vary across countries that are at a similar stage of development. To do this,
we characterize an asymmetric equilibrium in our North-North model. In this equilibrium, one
country sets patent breadth at a positive level while the other free rides by providing more limited
protection or even none at all. This type of asymmetric equilibrium rationalizes the asymmetry
in patent protection across the industrialized countries during the late 19th and early 20th
Centuries. While Britain, Germany, France and the US had already introduced patent laws
by the early 19th Century, in 1869 the Netherlands repealed its very poor patent law of 1817,
while Switzerland introduced an extremely rudimentarypatent law in 1888 and did not have
a comprehensive patent system until 1907. Schi¤ (1971) discusses how the Netherlands and
Switzerland were able to free ride on the patent protection provided by the other industrialized
countries, before eventually yielding to their pressure to coordinate through the International
Union for the Protection of Industrial Property. Thus, although our framework is highly stylized,
it provides a rationale for international interactions over intellectual property protection that
were until this point di¢ cult to make sense of.
In the North-North model, harmonization would raise world welfare but in a surprising
way. Under certain circumstances there is the familiar incentive to reach an agreement that
simultaneously raises patent breadth in all countries. The novel idea which we will bring to
light is that there may alternatively be an incentive for such agreements to impose a maximum
allowable patent breadth instead. This addresses a hitherto puzzling situation that has been
observed at the European Patent O¢ ce (EPO). Not only has the EPO upheld patents that some
member countries refused to grant, an example of coordination across Europe that raises the
breadth of patent protection. But the EPO has also revoked patents that have been granted by
member countries, an example of coordination that reduces patent breadth.9
Our results complement those obtained on the setting of optimal patent length in the liter-
ature on international trade and the protection of intellectual property. Deardor¤ (1991) uses
the classic model of Nordhaus (1969) to examine the impact of extending patent protection in
technology importing countries, and identies a trade-o¤ between a worsening terms of trade
and a higher world rate of innovation. Grossman and Lai (2004) solve for the non-cooperative
equilibrium in the setting of patent length (or equivalently the strictness of enforcement) when
9The Economist (2009) discusses examples of such occurrences.
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governments set policy to maximize national welfare and the industry structure is one of mo-
nopolistic competition. They nd that patent protection in the non-cooperative equilibrium will
be lower in countries that do less R&D, and that the non-cooperative equilibrium will involve
patent lengths that are too short relative to the cooperative level. The results for both our
North-South and North-North models di¤er in that Nash equilibrium may have either more or
less R&D than the optimal level. In both models this feature rests on the non-monotonic e¤ect
of increasing patent breadth on static welfare mentioned earlier. In our North-North model we
also have the possibility of asymmetric equilibria wherein similar countries have di¤erent levels
of protection in the Nash equilibrium.
Using a closed economy quality laddersendogenous growth model , Chor and Lai (2014)
examine the trade-o¤s faced by a government in the setting of the leading patent breadth.
Extending patent breadth makes a successful innovation more protable, but it also raises the
hurdle to obtaining a patent. They characterize the welfare maximizing patent breadth, and
show that it is less than the breath that maximizes the rate of innovation. Chu and Peng (2010)
analyze the optimal patent breadth in a two country quality ladders model where patent breadth
serves as a shift parameter on the prots of the innovator engaged in Bertrand competition with
potential imitators. They nd that in general the country with less innovative ability will choose
narrower patents.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 sets out the basic model and denes the patent-
breadth game. Sections 3 and 4 characterize equilibrium for the North-South and North-North
models respectively. The scope for international coordination over patent breadth is considered
in each section. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
2 The Model
We consider a model in which the governments of two countries, referred to as home and foreign,
set the breadths of patent protection for sales of a newly developed product in their respective
national markets. Two rms, one in each country, compete to develop a new product under the
constraints imposed by the patent breadths. In this section we set out the basic elements of
the model, which will allow us to characterize consumer preferences and rm technology, and
describe the 3-stage patent breadth game.
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In order to participate in the competition to develop a new product, a rm must pay a xed
cost of R&D, r; which is assumed to be the same for both rms. R&D results in the successful
development of a new product with probability  2 [0; 1] for the home rm and  2 [0; 1] for
the foreign rm (foreign variables are denoted with a ). Without loss of generality, assume
  .10 In the event that only one rm makes an innovation, it receives the patent on the
product. If both rms innovate successfully, each rm receives the patent with a probability of
1=2. If both engage in R&D, the probability of obtaining a patent is  (1  =2) for the home
rm and  (1  =2) for the foreign rm. We denote the innovation (that receives the patent)
by subscript-n.
Once the patent has been awarded, the innovator can produce the good at a constant
marginal cost, which we normalize to zero. The other rm can develop a competing product
that imitates the innovators good as long as it does not infringe on the patent. The imitation will
also have a marginal production cost of zero. We will assume that the xed cost of developing
the imitation is arbitrarily small, and that a rm can imitate whether or not it chose to engage
in R&D. If the imitator does not engage in the initial stage R&D, then it free-rides on the R&D
activity of the innovating rm in the event a new product is developed. The imitation is denoted
by subscript-m.11
Preferences of the home consumer are expressed as follows:
u (qm; qn;w) = e (qn + qm)  1
2
(qn + qm)
2   wqm + x: (1)
In this equation, qn is consumption of the innovation, qm is consumption of the imitation, x is
consumption of all other goods in the home market, and w is the distance in product space of
the imitation from the preferred location of the innovation. In the absence of patent protection,
which is equivalent to the narrowest patent breadth of w = 0; an imitator would choose to
produce a product that embodied all of the attributes of the innovators product and hence
be of equal value to consumers. The government, by choosing a patent breadth of w > 0;
restricts how close the imitators product can be to that of the innovator without infringing on
the innovators patent. For values of w su¢ ciently large, the product attribute that consumers
10For simplicity we assume that r,  and  are parametric. Essentially the same model characteristics would
be obtained, at the cost of greater complexity, if  and  were made to depend on r.
11We assume that once a product has been developed and patented, the knowledge acquired from R&D becomes
a public good that is available to the other rm even if it did not undertake R&D. So in a given market, the
asymmetry between the rms in competition results from the constraint on how similar an imitation is allowed
to be to the innovation by the breadth of the patent.
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value in the innovation will be so much less e¤ective or desirable in the imitation that it is
worthless to consumers.12 Preferences in the foreign country are assumed to be identical to
those at home, although the foreign choice of patent breadth, w, may di¤er from that at
home.13
We capture the dynamics of the problem as a three stage game. In the rst stage the
governments simultaneously choose patent breadth, (w;w). In the second stage, the home
and foreign rms choose whether or not to undertake R&D. This sequencing seems reasonable
since the process of government policy formation over patent law is usually more unwieldy than
rmsR&D decision making. We denote the home rms choice of actions by a 2 fd; fg, where
d represents development (i.e. incurring the cost r) and f represents free riding (or more
generally no investment in R&D). The foreign action choice a is dened similarly. In the event
that R&D is successful at developing a new product, a patent is awarded to the innovator. In
stage 3, the innovator and imitator compete as Cournot duopolists in segmented markets. If
R&D is unsuccessful, no production occurs. We solve this problem by backward induction.
2.1 The Production Stage
At the third stage, the roles of innovator and imitator have been determined by the patent award
(assuming a successful innovation has been made) and w = (w;w) is given by the rst stage
government decisions. We make the standard segmented market assumption, so rms compete
on a market-by-market basis. Due to our symmetry assumptions, the national identity of the
innovating rm (home or foreign) does not matter for now.14 From (1), the inverse demand
function in the home market for n and m will be pn = e   qn   qm and pm = e   qn   qm   w
12For tractability we are taking a reduced form approach to modelling patent breadth. In a structural model,
we would still think of patent breadth as setting an upper bound on the embodiment of an innovative element of
the patented product as we do here. But we would also allow for the possibility that the imitator could produce
a product that embodied less of the innovative element than stipulated by w. Under reasonable conditions, it
could then be shown that the imitating rm would maximize prots by maximizing the innovative element in
its product up to the limit imposed by the patent breadth, w. This would be equivalent to thinking of patent
breadth as limiting the quality level of the imitation relative to the innovation, and the imitating rm maximizing
prots by setting a quality level that is bound from above by the level of w.
13Di¤erentiation across another product element such as color or design may be captured by extending (1) to
the form u = e (qn + qm)   2 (qn + qm)2   1 2
 
(qn)
2 + (qm)
2   wqm + x, where  2 [0; 1] is a parameter that
determines substitutability between the innovation and the imitation in the element not covered by the patent.
We have carried out all of the analysis for this extended functional form and it makes little di¤erence to our
results, so we will not elaborate further on this in the paper.
14 In our setting, the mode of market entry by the imitator does not matter either. This could be by licensing,
exports or foreign direct investment. We will abstract here from any possible variation in the costs associated
with di¤erent modes of entry by the imitator.
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respectively.15 Firm prots from the home market will be n = pnqn and m = pmqm. Outputs
for the foreign market, fqn; qmg are determined similarly. It is then straightforward to solve for
the Nash equilibrium output and prot levels. Throughout the paper, a b over a variable
denotes its value in Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 1 For w  wmax = e=2, the Nash equilibrium output and price levels are given by:
q^n (w) =
e+ w
3
; q^m (w) =
e  2w
3
; p^n (w) =
e+ w
3
; p^m (w) = p^n   w:
For w > wmax, output levels are:
q^n =
e
2
; q^m = 0:
Firm prots in equilibrium are:
^i (w) = (q^i (w))
2 for i 2 fn;mg:
An increase in patent breadth makes the imitation less attractive to consumers, leading to a shift
of output and prots from the imitator to the innovator. For w  wmax, patent protection is
su¢ ciently broad that it deters production by the imitator. Due to the assumption of identical
demand functions across markets, the results of Lemma 1 also characterize outcomes in the
foreign market. The global prots of a rm are expressed as
i(w) = ^i (w) + ^

i (w
) for i = m;n (2)
Total industry output in the home market will be Q^(w) = q^n (w) + q^m (w) = (2e   w)=3,
which is decreasing in patent breadth. Since pn = pm + w in any equilibrium where imitated
goods are consumed, consumer surplus will be a function of the industry output, S(Q) = 12Q
2.
The following result, which will be useful in the analysis below, summarizes the e¤ect of patent
breadth on industry prots and social welfare in a given market.
15Because the xed cost of developing a new product is arbitrarily small, an imitator develops two imitations:
one tailored to w and one to w. If product development were more costly then an imitator might only develop a
single good, and have to decide whether to tailor it to w or w. Introducing costs of developing a new imitating
product increases the number of cases to be considered, but does not change the basic incentives of the countries
regarding patent breadth. Therefore, we have adopted the assumption of costless imitation to simplify the analysis.
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Figure 1: Total Surplus at Home as a Function of Patent Breadth
Lemma 2 Assume w 2 [0; wmax]:
(a) The Nash equilibrium industry prot from sales in the home market, ^n (w) + ^m (w), is
strictly convex in w. Joint prots are minimized at w = e=5 and maximized at wmax:
(b) The sum of consumer and producer surplus in the home market, S(Q^(w))+ ^n (w)+ ^m (w),
is strictly convex in w and is minimized at w = 4e11 : The sum of consumer and producer surplus
for w < 5e22 exceeds that at w = wmax.
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition behind Lemma 2 is as follows. Starting from
any w 2 (0; wmax], making patent breadth narrower will raise industry output and reduce the
innovators price, which potentially raises total surplus, S(Q^(w))+^n (w)+^m (w), but it does so
by shifting sales from the innovator to the imitator. Since the imitators product is less attractive
to consumers for any w > 0, this shift in sales results in an ambiguous e¤ect on total surplus.
As illustrated in Figure 1, in the neighborhood of wmax the di¤erence in value to the consumer
between the imitation and the innovation is su¢ ciently large that the increased competition
resulting from a reduction in w actually reduces total surplus. When the gap between the
attractiveness of products is su¢ ciently small, however, the narrowing of patent breadth must
raise total surplus. For total surplus to be above the level associated with monopoly, patent
breadth must be no greater than w = 5e22 : A similar result holds for the foreign market.
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The features of the home market surplus function identied in Lemma 1 and Figure 1
play a central role in our analysis. Although the specic cuto¤ values reect our functional
form assumptions, we show in the Appendix that the properties that surplus is convex in w,
maximized and decreasing in w at w = 0; and increasing at w = wmax hold for much more
general settings.16
2.2 The R&D and Patent Breadth Decisions
We will focus on two special cases in our analysis of the model. The rst, which we refer to as
the North-South model, assumes that  > 0 and  = 0: The foreign rm has no possibility of
innovating in this case so the only question at the R&D stage is whether patent protection is
su¢ ciently broad worldwide to result in the home rm undertaking R&D. This case emphasizes
the di¤erence in incentives between countries in setting patent breadth, which arises because
the Northern government knows that its rm will always be the innovator and the Southern
government that its rm will be the imitator. The second case, which we refer to as the North-
North model, assumes that  =  > 0: In this case the equilibrium at the R&D stage could
involve a patent race between the two rms, with both engaging in R&D, if patent protection
is su¢ ciently broad worldwide. The objective functions of the home and foreign governments
will be symmetric in this case, since each countrys rm has the same probability of being the
innovator. This structure will allow us to explore whether the patent breadth game can have
multiple equilibria, one involving a patent race and one not. We examine the game for each of
these cases in turn.
3 Equilibrium in the North-South Model
Since the foreign (Southern) rm cannot be a successful innovator, its optimal action will nec-
essarily be to choose free riding on home rm innovations, a = f. The expected prot of the
home rm will be  (d; f;w; r) = n(w)   r if it engages in R&D, and  (f; f;w; r) = 0
if it does not. The equilibrium at the second stage will thus involve R&D by the home rm
if and only if  (d; f;w; r)  0. Since prots are increasing in patent breadth in each mar-
16The discussion in the Appendix demonstrates two things. First, the property that total surplus is decreasing
in w at w = 0 only requires the standard condition for stability of Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Second, the property
that, approaching wmax from below, total surplus is increasing in w requires only that quantities qm and qn are
strategic substitutes.
11
0 wmax
w
5e/22
5e/22
•
ρ1(wmax,5e/22)
ρ1(5e/22,0)
ρ1(wmax,0)
Figure 2: Equilibrium in the North-South Model
ket, there will be a unique value of r satisfying  (d; f;w; r) = 0, which we denote by 1(w).
The values of w at which 1(w) = r represent the minimum overall patent breadth protection
required to induce R&D by the home rm for given r. Figure 2 illustrates the 1(w) loci for
three values of r that will play a critical role in the results below: 1
 
5e
22 ; 0

, 1 (wmax; 0) and
1
 
wmax;
5e
22

. If r = 1 (wmax; 0), for example, then the governments must set a combination
of patent breadths w that lies on or above the 1 (wmax; 0) locus in order for the home rm
to expect to make a prot from undertaking R&D. The 1(w) locus is negatively sloped and
concave to the origin due to the properties of the prot functions established in Lemma 1. Since
the quantity choices of the rms are invariant for w  wmax by Lemma 1, we can restrict at-
tention to w 2 W  [0; wmax]  [0; wmax] without loss of generality. Increases in r result in a
rightward shift in the 1(w) locus. It may also be helpful to note the location of two loci that
are not shown in Figure 2 to avoid clutter. The 1 (0; 0) locus goes through the origin and the
1 (wmax; wmax) locus goes through the top right hand corner of W .
We now turn to the choice of patent breadth in the rst stage. Home country welfare, ~v,
is given by the sum of the innovating rms prots in the two markets and consumer surplus at
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home when evaluated at the Nash equilibrium output levels:
~v (w; r) =
(


n(w) + S(Q^ (w))

  r for  (d; f;w; r)  0
0 for  (d; f;w; r) < 0
(3)
Broader patent breadth will shift prots from the foreign imitator to the home innovator, while
reducing consumer surplus at home. Di¤erentiating (3) with respect to w and w yields
@~v (w; r)
@w
=
w
3
 0, @~v (w; r)
@w
=
2(e+ w)
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> 0 for  (d; f;w; r)  0: (4)
The gain in prots from increasing patent breadth dominates the loss of consumer surplus for
all w 2 [0; wmax) and  (d; f;w; r)  0; so w^(w) = wmax in the home country. Since welfare is
independent of w for  (d; f;w; r) < 0, setting w = wmax is a weakly dominant strategy for the
home government. An increase in the breadth of foreign patents has a favorable spillover e¤ect
on the home country because it raises the return from innovation.
For the foreign country, welfare is the sum of imitator prots and consumer surplus in the
domestic (i.e. foreign) market:
~v (w; r) =
(


m (w) + S

Q^ (w)

if  (d; f;w; r)  0
0 if  (d; f;w; r) < 0
Di¤erentiating with respect to w and w yields
@~v (w; r)
@w
=   (2e  3w)
3
< 0,
@~v (w; r)
@w
=  4 ((e  2w)
9
< 0 (5)
for  (d; f;w; r)  0 and w 2W:
Making patent protection broader in the foreign country will transfer surplus from foreign con-
sumers and the imitating foreign rm to the innovating home rm, which reduces foreign welfare.
Increases in the home patent breadth will reduce foreign welfare similarly. Since foreign welfare
is 0 if the home rm does not undertake R&D and is positive if the home rm does, the best
response for the foreign government is the minimum value of w such that  (d; f;w; r)  0,
which we denote by j(w; r) if it exists. (We will clarify in due course the circumstances under
which j(w; r) exists.) In other words, the foreign government will choose the minimum patent
breadth necessary to induce R&D by the home rm.
Combining the best responses for the respective countries yields the following result.
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Proposition 1. Assume the North-South model.
(a) If r 2 (1 (wmax; 0) ; 1 (wmax; wmax)) then in Nash equilibrium the home government
sets patent breadth w^ = wmax and the foreign government sets w^ = j(w^; r) > 0.
(b) If r 2 [1(0; 0); 1 (wmax; 0)]; then the home government sets patent breadth w^ = wmax
and the foreign government sets patent breadth w^ = 0 in the Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 1 can be illustrated using Figure 2. In both cases (a) and (b), the home government
makes patent breadth as broad as possible to maximize the prot of its innovating rm; w^ =
wmax. For r > 1 (wmax; 0), protection in the foreign market is necessary for the home rm to
have an incentive to engage in R&D; w^ = j(w; r) > 0. In this region the Nash equilibrium will
be at the intersection of the 1 (w) locus with the right boundary of W . For r < 1 (wmax; 0),
maximum patent protection in the home country is su¢ cient to ensure R&D is undertaken and
the foreign government sets w^ = 0 so the Nash equilibrium is in the bottom corner of the right
boundary of W . In this region of r, the home government chooses a higher level of protection
than is necessary to ensure R&D because it wants to shift prots to its innovating rm. The
Nash equilibrium of the patent breadth game in the North-South model is always on the right
boundary of W .
This result shows that, in a non-cooperative equilibrium, the South will free ride on patent
protection as long as its market is not essential for making R&D protable. Even when South-
ern patent protection is essential it will be the minimum su¢ cient for protability. While we
have assumed symmetric market sizes, in practice South markets are relatively small for most
products in comparison with developed country markets in the North. Developing countries
would thus have an incentive to provide no patent breath for most products, with the exception
being products such as pharmaceuticals for the treatment of tropical diseases where the primary
demand is in developing country markets.17
A natural question to ask is whether world welfare could be raised by an agreement between
the home and foreign country regarding patent breadth. Assuming that lump sum transfers
between countries are possible, an e¢ cient international agreement on patent breadth will be
17Note here that we are assuming the South is able to commit to a level of patent breadth, so that the
innovator would know at the time of the investment the amount of patent breath that can be expected if the
R&D is successful. In a multiperiod model with ongoing R&D, there would be an incentive for the South to
develop a reputation for protecting innovations for products where its market is essential.
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one that chooses w to maximize world welfare,

(w;r)  ~v (w;r) + ~v(w; r)
subject to the constraint that  (d; f;w; r)  0.18 Lemma 2 established that total surplus in
each of the individual markets will be strictly convex in patent breadth, given that an innovation
has occurred, so 
 will be strictly convex in w and w: The following result establishes that,
depending on the level of r, the non-cooperative equilibrium in patent breadth may involve too
little patent protection (relative to the social optimum), too much patent protection, or the
socially optimal amount of patent protection.
Proposition 2. Assume the North-South model.
(a) If r 2 (1(wmax; 5e22); 1(wmax; wmax)), world welfare is maximized at w = w = wmax: Patent
breadth in the Nash equilibrium is below the world welfare maximizing level.
(b) If r 2 [1( 5e22 ; 0); 1(wmax; 5e22)], world welfare is maximized at w =wmax and w =
j(wmax; r): Patent breadth in the Nash equilibrium is at the world welfare maximizing level.
(c) If r < 1(
5e
22 ; 0), world welfare is maximized at w =j(0; r) and w
 = 0: Patent breadth
in the Nash equilibrium is above the world welfare maximizing level.
The proof is in the Appendix. The intuition for this result can be obtained by referring to Figure
2. The rst part of the proof shows that world iso-welfare contours are more convex than the
1 (w) loci, so that any point on the interior ofW is dominated in world welfare terms by a point
on the boundary that yields the same expected prots from R&D. Therefore, the set of world
welfare maximizing w combinations must be contained in the boundary points of W . However,
not all points on the boundary maximize world welfare; the sets of points that do maximize
world welfare are shown in bold in Figure 2. By Lemma 2b, any point on the boundary with a
patent breadth choice in the interval ( 5e22 ; wmax) yields lower welfare than choosing the maximum
patent breadth, wmax. Since raising patent breadth will increase the expected prots of the home
rm, such an increase is also feasible. Therefore, no boundary points with patent breadth in the
interval ( 5e22 ; wmax) can be world welfare maximizing. If the 1(w) locus intersects the boundary
18We are examining a constrained social welfare optimum in which R&D must be nanced through patent
protection. A social planner with the ability to impose lump sum taxes to nance R&D could achieve higher
welfare by using marginal cost pricing for the good. We choose the constrained optimum to focus on the distortions
introduced by competition between governments, so we restrict the planner to the same instruments as available
to the governments.
15
at a point in the bold set, then that point is the world welfare maximum. If the 1(w) locus
intersects the boundary at a point not contained in the bold set, then patent breadth in the
corresponding country should be raised to wmax to maximize world welfare. Note that the world
welfare maximum could be achieved by the foreign government setting a positive patent breadth
and the home government not doing so. The home rm would still undertake R&D but foreign
consumers would be paying most of the cost. This outcome would not arise when governments
are choosing policies because each government maximizes the surplus of its own consumers and
rms, but the world welfare criterion does not distinguish who pays for or receives surplus.
Hence the bold sections on the boundary of Figure 2 indicating the world welfare maximizing
policy combinations are symmetrical.
Recall from Proposition 1 that the Nash equilibrium points are those on the right hand
boundary of the box. Part (a) of Proposition 2 arises when r is su¢ ciently high that the foreign
government must choose w^ > 5e22 in the Nash equilibrium in order to induce R&D by the home
rm. In this region, the foreign government chooses a lower level of patent breadth than is
socially optimal in order to make entry more protable for its imitating rm; it chooses w^ =
j(w^; r) while the home government sets w^ = wmax (part a of Proposition 1) and w = w = wmax
is the social optimum. Part (c) of Proposition 2 shows that if r is su¢ ciently low that R&D
investment will be undertaken for w < 5e22 , the Nash equilibrium patent breadth at home exceeds
the socially optimal level; home chooses w^ = wmax while the foreign government sets w^ = 0
(part b of Proposition 1) and w = j(0; r), w = 0 corresponds to the social optimum. In
this region, the desire of the home country to protect its rm by deterring entry of the foreign
imitator is socially costly. For intermediate values of r as identied in part (b) of Proportion 2,
the Nash equilibrium coincides with a world welfare maximum.
The convexity of the world welfare contours means that the world welfare maximizing
policy does not involve the harmonization of patent breath across countries in cases (b) and
(c) in Proposition 2, where the zero-expected-prot condition is binding. It is e¢ cient for
consumers in one of the countries to pay for as much of the patent protection as possible, rather
than spreading it evenly between countries. Clearly, lump sum transfers between countries are
required to make such an agreement individually rational for both of the countries. In case (a)
of Proposition 2, the world welfare maximizing solution does involve harmonization (at wmax)
but lump sum transfers would still be required to reach an agreement at this level. In this
16
case, the 1 (w) locus lies above the 1 (wmax; 0) locus and so the Nash equilibrium lies at the
point where the 1 (w) locus intersects the right boundary of W . So in Nash equilibrium the
home government sets w^ = wmax at the socially optimal level, but the foreign government sets
w^ = j(w; r); which is below the social optimum. Therefore, agreeing to the social optimum for
the foreign government would require a deviation from its best response for which it would need
to be compensated.
4 Equilibrium in the North-North Model
We now turn to the analysis of the North-North model, where each rm has the same probability
 > 0 of successfully discovering a new product and obtaining the patent. This leads to the
possibility that there are Nash equilibria in which both rms enter into a patent race, as well
as equilibria in which only one rm nds it protable to undertake R&D. In the latter case,
symmetry ensures that there be two Nash equilibria, (d; f) and (f; d). To provide a unique
equilibrium outcome to the game for all values of r, we will assume that at the beginning of the
second stage nature randomly selects one of the rms (with equal probability) to move rst in the
R&D decision. This assumption maintains the symmetry between the home and foreign rms.19
Since the home and foreign rms are symmetric, we can derive the best-response functions by
considering the decision of the home rm only.
If the foreign rm does not undertake R&D then the home rms best response is to under-
take R&D if  (d; f;w; r)  0; as in the North-South model. If the foreign rm does undertake
R&D, the home rm expects to earn  (f; d;w; r) = m(w)  0 as an imitator if it does not
enter into a patent race and  (d; d;w; r) =  (1  =2) [n (w) + m (w)]  r from the patent
race if it enters. Therefore, entry by the home rm into a patent race will be a best response to
entry by the foreign rm if and only if
 (w; r)  

1  
2

n (w)  
2
2
m (w)  r  0:
So  (w; r) represents the home rms expected gain over imitation from entering a patent race.
This equation is increasing in w and w for all w 2 W , because broadening patent protection
in either country makes innovation more protable and imitation less so.
19This can be thought of as reecting randomness in the R&D process that allows one of the rms to be slightly
ahead in the process of innovation at the point where a signicant resource commitment (r) must be made.
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The payo¤s in this model exhibit strategic substitutability with regard to the rms choice
of R&D action, since the expected prot from undertaking R&D is lower when the other rm is
doing so as well. Specically, we have  (d; f;w; r) >  (w; r) for any given r and w 2W . Since
 (w; r) is increasing in w, there will be a unique value of r at which expected prots are zero
when both rms engage in R&D. We denote this value of r by 2(w). If r  2(0; 0), a patent
race arises even for the narrowest possible patent protection, while for r > 2(wmax; wmax) a
patent race would never arise.
In this section we will limit attention to the parameter space where one rm will undertake
R&D even with the narrowest patent protection w = (0; 0), i.e. 1(0; 0)  r, and a patent race
can be induced with su¢ ciently broad patent protection, i.e. r > 2 (0; 0). Government policy
will then determine whether or not there is a patent race or whether only one rm will undertake
R&D. The following assumption restricts the parameter space of r accordingly.20
A1. Assume 1(0; 0) =
2
9 e
2  r > 2 (0; 0) = 2(1 )9 e2:
The relationship between government policy and equilibrium industry structure is illustrated in
Figure 3. The locus of values of w consistent with entry into R&D by both rms, 2(w) = r
0, is
shown in Figure 3 for a particular value, r = r0. Assumption A1 ensures that the 2 (w) locus
intersects W , as illustrated, but that the 1 (w) locus does not. For r = r
0, both rms will have
a patent race if w lies on or above the 2 (w) = r
0 locus. If w lies below the 2 (w) = r
0 locus
then only one rm undertakes R&D. This locus will be convex to the origin, and a value of r
greater than r0 will be represented by a 2 (w) locus to the right of 2 (w) = r
0.
For a given value of w, we can dene b (w; r) as the minimum home patent breadth required
to induce a patent race. Figure 3 illustrates this for a particular value w1 and corresponding
b
 
w1; r

. Note that since the 2 (w) = r
0 locus intersects the bottom horizontal axis, b (w; r)
will exist for all w. This arises because R&D costs are su¢ ciently low that the home government
can induce a patent race even when the foreign country chooses the narrowest possible patent
protection of 0. However, this will not be the case if the 2 (w) locus does not intersect the
bottom horizontal axis, i.e. if r > 2 (wmax; 0). In that case b (w
; r) will only exist for w
su¢ ciently high. By symmetry of the model, the same logic applies for the foreign government.
20This restriction should be viewed as a restriction on the value of r relative to  rather than on  itself. If
r > 1 (0; 0) then governments could set patent breadths su¢ ciently narrow that no rm would undertake R&D.
If r  2 (0; 0) then, as remarked above, a patent race could arise regardless of government policy choices. A1
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Figure 3: The Parameter Spaces for which R&D by One or Both Firms is Protable
We can now use the characterization of rm decisions at the second stage to solve for the
best responses of the governments at the rst stage. For the North-North model we will use
the notation ~vNN (w;w) to denote home welfare. Since the North-North model is symmetrical,
foreign welfare will be given by ~vNN (w; w) as well.21 Under our assumption that fd; fg and
ff; dg occur with equal probability when R&D is protable for only one rm, the payo¤ function
of the home country is as follows:22
~vNN (w; r) =

(2  )V (w)  r if (w;r)  0
V (w)  r=2 if 0 > (w;r) (6)
where V (w) = 12n(w) +
1
2m(w) + S(Q^(w)) is the sum of consumer and producer surplus
in the event that an innovation is made. The home country expects a higher surplus from an
innovation when both rms enter the patent race, but must pay a higher expected R&D cost.
The symmetry of the probability that either rm makes an innovation means that each countrys
thus rules out ranges of the parameter space that are not particularly interesting from a policy perspective.
21We focus on a symmetrical model to show that an asymmetric equilibrium can arise in such an environment.
This outcome would be less surprising in an asymmetrical environment, which would also be more cumbersome to
work with. The results of our North-South model give a clear indication of the forces introduced by asymmetry
and how the results are di¤erent.
22The reason that, in evNN (w; r), r is divided by 2 if 0 >  (w; r) is because under the strategy prole fd; fg
there is, ex ante, a probability of 1=2 that the home rm is selected to choose rst whether or not it wants to
undertake R&D.
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rm is equally likely to serve in the role of imitator and innovator, both in the outcome where
one rm undertakes R&D and when both rms enter into a patent race. Di¤erentiating V (w)
yields
@V (w)
@w
=  q^m(w) < 0 @V (w)
@w
=
(5w   e)
9
(7)
Expected surplus is decreasing in the countrys own patent breadth, w, because the expected loss
in consumer surplus and imitator prots resulting from an increase in w exceeds the expected
gain in innovator prots. The fact that the home countrys rm is equally likely to be innovator
or imitator means that the national interest is aligned with the interests of consumers and the
imitator. Note the contrast with the North-South model, where the fact that the home rm was
always the innovator meant that national welfare was aligned with the interest of the innovator.
The e¤ect of the other countrys patent breadth, w, operates through its impact on expected
rm prots in the export market. Expected prots of the home rm are increasing (decreasing)
in patent breadth for w greater (less) than e=5 by Lemma 2(a).
To derive the best-response function under A1, note that for given w the home welfare
expression (6) yields two di¤erent segments. If b(w; r) exists, then only one rm engages in
R&D for w < b(w; r) and there is a patent race for w  b(w; r). This case arises when r is
su¢ ciently low and/or w is su¢ ciently high that Home can induce a patent race by making w
su¢ ciently high (e.g. w1 in Figure 3). Home welfare ~vNN (w; r) has a discontinuity at the point
b(w; r) where the industry structure switches by the addition of a rm doing R&D as illustrated
in Figure 4. Welfare is decreasing in w on [b(w; r); wmax] from (7), so the maximum on this
interval occurs at b(w; r). Similarly, welfare is decreasing in w on [0; b(w; r)); so the maximum
on that interval occurs at 0. Therefore, the home country will choose whichever of 0 or b(w; r)
yields a higher payo¤. Figure 4 illustrates a case where ~vNN (0; w; r)  ~vNN (b(w; r); w; r)
but the reverse can also arise, for example if r is relatively low. If b(w; r) does not exist then
only one rm engages in R&D for all w 2 [0; wmax]. In this case, since welfare is decreasing on
[0; wmax], the best response is 0.
This discussion shows that the home countrys best response for patent breadth will be
the minimum required to induce entry by the desired number of innovating rms. Since the
home rm is equally likely to be innovator or imitator in the North-North model, the home
government does not have the incentive to use patent breadth to shift prots to the innovating
rm. Consumer interests dominate for a given number of rms engaged in R&D, so the home
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Figure 4: Home Welfare in the North-North Model (given foreign policy)
government does not want to allow any greater patent breadth than is necessary to induce the
optimal number of rms to do R&D. The foregoing discussion holds for the foreign country as
well because its best-response function is symmetric to that of Home. These observations are
summarized in the following result.
Lemma 4: Assume the North-North model. The home countrys best-response function has
the property that
a) If b(w; r) exists, then the best response is b(w; r) if ~vNN (b(w; r); w; r)  ~vNN (0; w; r)
and 0 otherwise.
b) If b(w; r) does not exist, then the best response is 0:
We can use Lemma 4 to derive the necessary and su¢ cient conditions for w^ = (w^; w^) to be
part of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the patent breadth game.
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Lemma 5: Assume the North-North model with r 2 [2(0; 0); 1 (0; 0)]
(a) w^ is an equilibrium with only one rm engaged in R&D i¤ w^ = (0; 0) and
vNN (0; 0; r)  vNN (w; 0; r) for w 2 [0; wmax] (8)
(b) w^ is an equilibrium with a patent race i¤ 2(w^) = r and
vNN (w^; 2(w^))  vNN (0; w^; 2(w^)) (9)
vNN (w^; 2(w^))  vNN (w^; 0; 2(w^))
With only one rm undertaking R&D, a countrys payo¤ is maximized by choosing the narrowest
patent protection. Therefore, any equilibrium where only one rm undertakes R&D must have
w^ = (0; 0). Part (a) shows that, in order for w^ = (0; 0) to be an equilibrium, it must dominate
the payo¤ obtained by deviating to a patent breadth that would induce a patent race. If an
equilibrium exists with a patent race, as in part (b), then it must involve choices of patent
breadth such that rms are indi¤erent between engaging in R&D or not: 2(w^) = r. Otherwise,
national welfare could be increased by narrowing patent breadth in the country where the rm is
not indi¤erent. Note that in the case of a patent race, the Nash equilibrium will not necessarily
involve equal choices of patent breadth across countries.
4.1 Symmetric Nash Equilibria
We will focus initially on the existence of symmetric Nash equilibria. Figure 5 identies the set
of values of (r; ) associated with A1. This parameter range lies between the 2(0; 0) and 1(0; 0)
loci in Figure 5, where 1(0; 0) is linear in  and 2 (0; 0) = (1   )1(0; 0). We will identify
the respective parameter ranges for which there is an equilibrium with a patent race, and an
equilibrium with only a single rm undertaking R&D. The reason for focusing on symmetric
equilibria is to show the potential multiplicity of equilibria and how international agreements to
coordinate policy could raise welfare without requiring transfers.
We rst identify the parameter range for which (0; 0) is an equilibrium. By Lemma 5(a), it
will fail to be an equilibrium if one government can choose b(w; r) such that entry into a patent
race by the second rm will be induced and the government will obtain a higher payo¤ from
this. The h () locus is dened as the locus of (r; ) combinations for which ~vNN (0; 0; 2(w; 0)) =
~vNN (w; 0; 2(w; 0)); that is, given that the foreign government sets w
 = 0, along the h () locus
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Figure 5: Characterization of Equilibria under A1
the home government is just indi¤erent between setting w = 0, inducing only one rm to
undertake R&D, and setting w > 0 at the level that is just su¢ cient to induce a patent race
between both rms. It is shown in the Appendix that the h () locus must be negatively sloped
and will intersect the 1(0; 0) locus at 0  :476 as illustrated in Figure 5. The pair (0; 0) cannot
be an equilibrium for  < 0 because the probability of success by one rm is su¢ ciently low that
one government will nd it optimal to o¤er patent protection su¢ ciently broad to induce both
rms to engage in R&D. Note also that ~vNN (0; 0; 2(w; 0))   ~vNN (w; 0; 2(w; 0)) is increasing
in r, so (0; 0) is an equilibrium in the regions A, B and C above the h () locus in Figure 5. A
higher value of r raises the xed cost of R&D, which makes the industry equilibrium in which
only one rm undertakes R&D relatively more attractive. Using a similar argument, (0; 0) fails
to be an equilibrium in region D, below the h () locus, because at such relatively low values of
r a patent race can be induced with a relatively narrow patent breadth.
We next consider the conditions under which there can be a symmetric equilibrium with
a patent race. A symmetric equilibrium is one in which each country chooses the same patent
breadth, (w^; w^) where w^ = b(w^; r). This symmetric pair will be an equilibrium if it yields higher
welfare to the home country than could be obtained from a deviation by the home government
to w = 0. This deviation involves a trade-o¤ of the loss from the lower probability of successful
innovation when only one rm undertakes R&D against the gain from shifting the cost of patent
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protection onto foreign consumers. The choice of w = 0 becomes more attractive relative to
the symmetric patent race equilibrium as r increases, because a higher value of r lowers the
payo¤ in the patent race by more than it lowers the payo¤ when only one rm engages in
R&D. It is shown in the Appendix that for values of  su¢ ciently low, entry into R&D by a
second rm is su¢ ciently protable that there will be a symmetric patent race equilibrium for
all r 2 [2(0; 0); 1(0; 0)]: For larger values of , there will be a threshold value k() such that
the patent race equilibrium does not exist for r > k(). The k() locus is also illustrated in
Figure 5. For values below (above) the k() locus a patent race with w = b(w; r) is (is not) an
equilibrium in the patent breadth game. Therefore, symmetric equilibria w^ = (w^; b(w^; r)) exist
for values of (r; ) in regions B, C and D of Figure 5. This establishes that a symmetric Nash
equilibrium exists for all (r; ) in these regions. We can summarize this discussion as follows.
Proposition 3. Assume the North-North model and that A1 holds. There exist values
h(); k() 2 (2(0; 0); 1(0; 0)] with k()  h() such that:
(a) For r 2 [h(); 1(0; 0)] there exists a Nash equilibrium with w^ = (0; 0) wherein one rm
undertakes R&D.
(b) For r 2 [2(0; 0); k()] there exists a symmetric Nash equilibrium with a patent race
and patent breadth w = b(w; r) in each country.
The proof is in the Appendix. Proposition 3 illustrates that the equilibria with a patent race are
sustainable in regions where r and  are relatively low. Lower values of both of these parameters
make R&D by a second rm more attractive, and thus make an equilibrium with a patent race
more likely.
Proposition 3 also establishes that for r 2 [h(); k()]; which corresponds to regions B
and C of Figure 5, there will be two symmetric Nash equilibria. One is an equilibrium with
w^ = (0; 0) and only one rm undertaking R&D, and the other is an equilibrium with broader
patent protection w^ = (w^; b(w^; r)) and a patent race. The potential for equilibria involving
multiple industry structures suggests a coordination failure on the part of the governments. A
government does not nd it protable to broaden protection to induce entry into R&D when
the other government chooses the narrowest patent protection. But it does nd it desirable to
induce entry into R&D with broader protection if the other government also provides broader
protection.
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The existence of multiple symmetric equilibria raises the question of whether the equilibrium
with only one rm undertaking R&D provides lower or higher welfare than the equilibrium with
a patent race. The m() locus in Figure 5 shows the (r; ) combinations for which the Nash
equilibrium (0; 0), where only one rm engages in R&D, yields the same level of national welfare
as the Nash equilibrium with w^ = b(w^; r) > 0 and a patent race. For equilibria below the m()
locus and above the h() locus, the patent race equilibrium yields higher world welfare. For
equilibria above the m() locus and below the k() locus, it is the equilibrium where one rm
undertakes R&D that yields higher world welfare. This set of outcomes is summarized in the
following result, with a proof being given in the Appendix.
Proposition 4. Assume the North-North model and r 2 (2(0; 0); 1(0; 0)]. There exists a
value m(), satisfying h()  m()  k(), such that
(a) For r 2 [h();m()), the symmetric patent race equilibrium yields higher welfare than
can be obtained with only one rm undertaking R&D.
(b) For r 2 (m(); k()], the equilibrium with only one rm undertaking R&D yields higher
welfare than the symmetric patent race equilibrium.
In the regions B and C, if the countries are in the symmetric Nash equilibrium that yields lower
world welfare, there is the potential for a cooperative agreement to improve welfare without
transfers between countries. An international agreement would allow countries to coordinate
patent breadth on the higher payo¤ equilibrium. This coordination would involve both govern-
ments raising patent breadth if there is an equilibrium with only one rm in region C or, more
surprisingly, reducing patent breadth if there is a patent race equilibrium in region B.
4.2 Asymmetric Nash Equilibria
In addition to the symmetric equilibria there exist asymmetric Nash equilibria with a patent
race. Since, by Lemma 4a, the home best response in a patent race equilibrium is b (w; r),
the asymmetric equilibria will all take the form (b (w; r) ; w). As in the symmetric patent
race equilibria, countries provide the minimum patent protection to induce a patent race in
equilibrium. The only di¤erence is that in the asymmetric equilibria the country with the
broader patent protection will bear a higher share of the cost in terms of lost consumer surplus.
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Proposition 5. Assume the North-North model and r 2 (2(0; 0); 1(0; 0)].
(a) The pair (b (0; r) ; 0) is an equilibrium with a patent race for r  min[1(0; 0); h()]:
(b) For r 2 [2(0; 0); k()), there exist asymmetric patent race equilibria with patent
breadths in the neighborhood of the symmetric equilibrium.
In the Appendix, the proof of Proposition 5 establishes that (0; 0) is not an equilibrium in
region D of Figure 5. In this region, there would be an incentive to deviate to (b (0; r) ; 0) which
is an equilibrium with a patent race. However, (b (0; r) ; 0) is not an equilibrium outside of region
D. Since deviation incentives will be larger for the country with the broader patent protection,
asymmetric equilibria will be more di¢ cult to support in general. Part (b) establishes that,
in the interior of regions B and C of Figure 5, patent breadths can be di¤erent but must be
su¢ ciently close to each other in order to be sustainable as asymmetric equilibria.
5 Conclusions
We considered two versions of our model: a North-South model in which the Southern rm
can imitate but not innovate and a North-North model in which rms in each country have the
same probability of success at making an innovation. In the North-South model, countries use
patent breadth for prot-shifting reasons. The North chooses the broadest patent protection to
protect from Southern imitation, while the Southern government chooses the narrowest patent
protection consistent with innovative activity by the Northern rm. The Southern government
chooses narrow patent protection to benet Southern consumers and the imitating rm. This
results in a unique Nash equilibrium for patent breadth. We showed that the level of patent
protection in the Nash equilibrium could be either higher or lower than the socially optimal
level. However, there was no scope for agreement over patent breadths in the absence of lump
sum transfers in the North-South model. This occurs because of the asymmetry of interests
between North and South: The North wants broad patent breadth to generate prots for its
innovating rm while the South wants narrow patent breadth for its consumers and imitating
rm.
In the North-North model, by contrast, the interests of the two countries are symmetric
because the rm in each has an equal chance of being the innovator. In this case there is a free-
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rider problem that can lead to a multiplicity of equilibria for a given industry structure. Each
country would prefer that the other pay for R&D by imposing broad patent protection, so each
will choose the minimum protection required to induce the desired number of rms to undertake
R&D, given the other countrys policy. The North-North model also has the feature that both
a patent race and R&D by only one rm may arise in a Nash equilibrium in patent breadth for
some parameter values. In this case, an agreement to coordinate levels of patent breadth could
be welfare improving in the North-North model in the absence of transfers. The cooperative
agreement in the North-North model could involve either an increase or, more surprisingly,
a decrease over the levels set non-cooperatively by national governments. This could explain
why coordination over patent breadth at the European Union level, through the EPO, could
improve welfare; either by granting patents where individual member governments had failed to
do so or alternatively by revoking patents where they had been granted by individual member
governments.
A promising direction for future work would be, following Bessen and Maskin (2009), to
consider the possibility that imitation is a productive activity for the imitating rm and thus
raise the likelihood of future innovation by that rm. Bessen and Maskin (2009) show that an
equilibrium with patent protection might yield lower social welfare than an equilibrium without
patent protection when the act of imitation produces knowledge that may a¤ect the future
rate of innovation. They analyze this in a model of sequential innovation where rms produce
di¤erentiated products, which results in a complementarity in innovative activity between rms.
However, their setting is domestic and does not allow for strategic interaction in the breadth of
patent setting across countries. In a model that combined the Bessen-Maskin framework with
ours, very broad patent protection in the North could have the adverse e¤ect of reducing the
degree of accumulation of knowledge for future innovation. This e¤ect could add to the benet
that we have demonstrated of an agreement to lower patent breadth.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, industry prot gross of R&D costs is m(w) + n(w) =
(2e2   2ew + 5w2)=9 and consumer surplus is S(Q^ (w)) = (2e   w)2=18. Lemma 2 follows by
di¤erentiation of these functions.
Extension to General Utility Function.
We can also show that the basic properties of the surplus function illustrated in Figure 1
hold for more general utility functions. This is demonstrated in the following Lemma.
Lemma A.1. Let the utility function have the form U(qm; qn) = u(qm + qn) wqm; where
u is a strictly concave function on [0; Q]: Under the standard Cournot-Nash stability condition,
total surplus (w) = S(Q^(w)) + ^n (w) + ^m (w) will satisfy 0(0) < 0 and (0) > (wmax): It
will also satisfy 0(wmax) > 0 if qn and qm are strategic substitutes.
We begin by deriving the relationship between patent breadth and the outputs of the
innovator and the imitator. Letting p(Q) = u0(Q) denote the inverse demand function, the
necessary conditions for prot maximization of the respective rms are:
p (Q) + qnp
0 (Q) = 0
pn (Q)  w + qmp0 (Q) = 0
where we are using the fact that pn = p(Q) and pm = p(Q) w. Di¤erentiating these rst order
conditions and solving yields the comparative statics results
dqn
dw
=
  (p0 (Q) + qnp00 (Q))

and
dqm
dw
=
2p0 (Q) + qnp00 (Q)

;
where  p0 (Q) (3p0 (Q) +Qp00 (Q)) :We impose the standard Cournot-Nash stability condition
that  > 0; which ensures that dqmdw < 0. Note however that the general case allows for the
possibility that dqndw < 0 if the inverse demand function is su¢ ciently convex. Combining these
results yields the conclusion that total output must be decreasing in w;
dQ
dw
=
dqn
dw
+
dqm
dw
=
p0n (Q)

< 0:
Letting ^i(w) denote the equilibrium prot of a rm of type i, we have by the envelope theorem
that d^i(w)dw = qip
0(Q(w))dqjdw for i; j = m;n and i 6= j:
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Consumer surplus can be expressed as S(Q^(w)) = U

Q^(w)

 p

Q^(w)

Q^(w): An increase
in w must increase consumer surplus, since dSdw =  p0(Q^(w))Q^(w)dQdw > 0: Combining this with
the e¤ect on prots, we obtain
0(w) =  qnp0 (Q) dqn
dw
  qmp0 (Q) dqm
dw
: (10)
At w = wmax we have qm = 0, so (10) becomes 0(w) =  p0n (Q) qn dqndw : Thus, total surplus is
increasing at w = wmax if dqn=dw > 0. Since qm is decreasing in w, we require only that qm and
qn be strategic substitutes in order for dqn=dw > 0.
At w = 0, we have that qm = qn and (10) becomes 0(w) =  p0 (Q) qn dQdw < 0: Finally, we
must have that total surplus is greater at w = 0 than at w = wmax because the latter is the
monopoly solution at which only one rm produces positive output.jj
Proof of Proposition 2:
World welfare is maximized by choosing w to maximize 
(w; r) subject to the non-negative-
expected-prot constraint  (d; f;w; r)  0. Since 
(a; b; r) = 
(b; a; r), we restrict attention to
solutions where w  w. We rst show that if the constraint is binding, i.e.  (d; f;w; r) = 0,
then world welfare is maximized by choosing the maximum home patent breadth consistent
with  (d; f;w; r) = 0. Begin by assuming  (d; f;w; r) = 0. Now consider the e¤ect of an
increase in w accompanied by a reduction in w to maintain  (d; f; w; w; r) = 0, which requires
dw=dw =  (e+ w)=(e+ w). Using (4) and (5), the e¤ect of this change on world welfare is
d(~v + ~v)
dw
=
5e (w   w)
3 (e+ w)
:
An increase in w will reduce world welfare if w < w. This means that world welfare is
maximized by choosing the maximum home patent breadth w consistent with  (d; f;w; r) = 0.
To nd the world welfare optimum, with a view to proving parts (a)-(c), we compare
welfare at points where the zero-expected-prot constraint is slack with welfare at the best
point where the constraint binds. If r 2 (1(wmax; 0); 1(wmax; wmax)), the highest welfare with a
binding zero-expected-prot constraint occurs on the right hand boundary ofW in Figure 2, with
w = fwmax; j(wmax; r)g. This pair is also the Nash equilibrium by Proposition 1. By Lemma
2b, the pair fwmax; wmaxg sustains R&D and yields higher welfare than fwmax; j(wmax; r)g for
j(wmax; r) >
5e
22 . Since this yields the highest payo¤ consistent with  (d; f;w; r)  0 in this
interval, world welfare is maximized at fwmax; wmaxg. For r 2 (1(wmax; 5e22); 1(wmax; wmax)),
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under the world welfare maximum patent breadth in the foreign country exceeds that in the
Nash equilibrium. This establishes part (a).
For r 2 [1(wmax; 0); 1(wmax; 5e22)], welfare at fwmax; j(wmax; r)g exceeds that at fwmax; wmaxg
by Lemma 2b, so the Nash equilibrium pair fwmax; j(wmax; r)g maximizes world welfare. For
r < 1(wmax; 0); the highest welfare with a binding zero-expected-prot constraint occurs on the
lower boundary of W with w = fj(0; r); 0g. The argument here is similar to that on the right
boundary. If j(0; r) > 5e22 , then fwmax; 0g sustains R&D and yields higher welfare than fj(0; r); 0g
and yields non-negative expected prot. It also yields higher welfare than fwmax; wmaxg, so the
Nash equilibrium value of fwmax; 0g is socially optimal for r 2 [1( 5e22 ; 0); 1(wmax; 0)). Combin-
ing this with the discussion for r 2 [1(wmax; 0); 1(wmax; 5e22)] establishes part (b).
Finally, for r < (1(
5e
22 ; 0) the pair fj(0; r); 0g that yields zero expected prot will yield
higher welfare than the pair fwmax; 0g. Therefore, the world welfare maximizing patent breadth
of fj(0; r); 0g for the home government is less than that in the Nash equilibrium when r <
(1(
5e
22 ; 0); which proves (c).jj
Proof of Proposition 3:
a) Lemma 5 established that (8) must be satised in order for w^ = (0; 0) to be a Nash
equilibrium. A su¢ cient condition for (8) to be satised is that r  2(wmax; 0), because r
is su¢ ciently high that the home country is unable to induce a patent race by increasing w.
In this case, @v
NN
@w = 
@V
@w < 0 for w 2 [0; wmax] so Homes best response is w = 0. The set
of values satisfying this condition is given by r 2 [2(wmax; 0); 1(0; 0)] = [e2 (26  17) =72,
2e2=9]: The function g () = 2(wmax; 0) for 2(wmax; 0)  1(0; 0). Since 2(wmax; 0) = 1(0; 0)
is solved by  = 10=17, the region r 2 [g () ; 1(0; 0)] is non-empty for   10=17. Because the
foreign governments payo¤s are symmetrical, its best response is w = 0 over this range as well.
Therefore, the unique Nash equilibrium over this range is w^ = (0; 0).
For r 2 (2(0; 0); 2(wmax; 0)]; the home country can induce a patent race but it can also
induce only one rm to undertake R&D. Dening ~vNN (w; 0; r)   ~vNN (0; 0; r) to be the home
countrys gain from broadening its patent breadth to induce a patent race, it follows from (8)
that (0; 0) will be an equilibrium if ~vNN (w; 0; r)   ~vNN (0; 0; r)  0. We will now establish the
lower boundary of (r; ) combinations for which w^ = (0; 0), referred to as h (). Along h (), each
government is indi¤erent between inducing a patent race and inducing one rm to undertake
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R&D. First dene the function
~H(w; )  ~vNN (w; 0;  (w; 0))  ~vNN (0; 0;  (w; 0))
where use of r =  (w; 0) ensures the protability of a patent race. We use the intermediate
value theorem to show that for  2 [25 ; 1] there will exist a w 2 [0; wmax] that satises ~H(w; ) =
0. The function ~H(w; ) has the properties that it is positive at w = 0 and monotonically
decreasing over the range w 2 [0; wmax]: To see this, observe that ~H(0; ) = e23 (1   ) > 0 for
 2 (0; 1) and @ ~H(w; )=@w

w=0
=   e18(14  5) < 0, @ ~H(w; )=@w

w=wmax
=   e12 (2  ) < 0,
where @2 ~H(w; )=@w2 = 18 (22  7) establishes monotonicity. Now observe that ~H(wmax; ) =
7e2
144 (2   5) which is negative for  2 [25 ; 1). So by the intermediate value theorem there must
exist a value of w at which ~H(w; ) = 0. We denote this value by !(), which is given by
!() = e
 
14  5  
p
208   592   68
22  7
!
(11)
Note that !() > 0 for all  2 (0; 1). The lower boundary for which w^ = (0; 0) is then given by
substituting !() for w in 2 (w; 0). Since 1(0; 0) is increasing in  and 2(!(); 0) is decreasing
in , there is a unique value 0  :476 such that 2(!(); 0)  1(0; 0) i¤   0. Note that
0 >
2
5 . This establishes that the lower boundary of (r; ) combinations for which w^ = (0; 0) is
the function 2(!(); 0) for  2 (0; 1), so h () = 2(!(); 0) for  2 (0; 1). The fact that
@(~vNN (w; 0; r)  ~vNN (0; 0; r))=@r =  1
2
conrms that ~vNN (w; 0; r) ~vNN (0; 0; r) < 0 for all r 2 (2 (!(); 0) ;min (1 (0; 0) ; 2 (wmax; 0))],
as required for w^ = (0; 0) to be an equilibrium throughout the relevant range.
b) We begin by dening a function that can be used to characterize all pairs w^ that satisfy
the conditions for a Nash equilibrium with a patent race as dened in Lemma 5b. Let
Z(x; y)  ~vNN (x; y; 2(x; y))  ~vNN (0; y; 2(x; y));
which is the di¤erence between the payo¤ to the home country when rms are indi¤erent between
engaging and not engaging in R&D with patent breadths (x; y) and the home countrys payo¤
if it deviates to (0; y). By Lemma 5b, any Nash equilibrium with a patent race must involve
zero expected gain from engaging in R&D. A pair (x; y) with a zero expected gain patent race
is a Nash equilibrium if Z(x; y)  0 and Z(y; x)  0. Therefore, a pair of symmetric patent
breadths (w;w) is an equilibrium for r = (w;w) if Z(w;w)  0.
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Dene K(w) = Z(w;w). Identifying the set of symmetric Nash equilibria is equivalent to
nding the values of w for which K(w)  0: Di¤erentiating K(w) yields the fact that K is
strictly convex in w for  2 [0; 1], with
dK (w)
dw
=
w(5  2)  e(3  )
3
:
Since dK(wmax)dw =  e=6 < 0; K(w) is decreasing in w on [0; wmax]. Note also that K(0) =
H(0) > 0, so (w;w) must be an equilibrium for w su¢ ciently small. This yields two possibili-
ties. If K(w) is non-negative for all w such that 2(w;w) < 1(0; 0); then (w;w) is always an
equilibrium. If there exists w such that 2(w;w) < 1(0; 0) and K(w) = 0; then (w;w) fails to
be an equilibrium for all higher values of w. Solving K(w) = 0 yields the critical value for w to
be
() = e
 
3    
p
8   32   1
5  2
!
:
Setting k() = min[2((); ()); 1(0; 0)], a symmetric patent race equilibrium will exist for
r 2 min(2(0; 0); k()]: Note that 2((); ()) < 1(0; 0) for   2  :55. This yields the
desired cuto¤.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let M(w; ) = ~vNN (w;w; 2(w;w))   ~vNN (0; 0; 2(w;w)) be the
di¤erence in payo¤ between a patent race equilibrium with breadth w and the payo¤ with only
one rm engaging in R&D. We can limit attention to   :476, since for lower values of 
no equilibrium will exist with only one rm engaged in R&D. M is strictly convex in w with
@M(wmax; )=@w = 0; so M(w; ) is decreasing in w on [0; wmax]. Solving for the value of w at
which M(w; ) = 0 yields
() = e
 
10  3  
p
96   20  272
20  6
!
:
This solution satises () 2 [0; wmax] for   2=9; which holds over the interval of interest. Let
m() = 2((); ()), where m()  1(0; 0) for 1  :527: Since ()  () over the relevant
range, m()  k(). It can be shown that m()  h() as well. Therefore, the patent race
equilibrium is preferred for r 2 [h();min(1(0; 0);m())) and the equilibrium with one rm
undertaking R&D is preferred for r 2 (m();min(1(0; 0); k()].jj
Proof of Proposition 5: (a) Follows immediately from Lemma 5b and Proposition 3a.
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b) Z(x; y) is strictly convex in (x; y) with Zxx =
(22 7)
18 > 0; Zyy =
(8 5)
18 > 0, and Zxy =
0. Furthermore, x > y implies Z(x; y)  Z(y; x) =   118(x  y)[e (10  4)  (x+ y)(7  )] < 0
for x; y 2 [0; wmax] and  2 (0; 1). Thus, the government who sets broader patent protection will
have a larger incentive to deviate from a zero-expected-prot patent race when patent breadths
are asymmetric. We know from Proposition 3b that there exists a w0 such that Z(w0; w0) > 0
in this region. By the continuity of Z and 2, there will exist some "
+ > 0 > "  such that
2(w0+ "
+; w0+ "
 ) = 2(w0; w0), Z(w0+ "+; w0+ " ) > 0 and Z(w0+ " ; w0+ "+) > 0: Thus,
(w0 + "+; w0 + " ) and (w0 + " ; w0 + "+) will also be equilibria. Note however that this result
cannot be established for Z(w;w) = 0 because there exist no local changes satisfying d2 = 0
such that both governments prefer the agreement to choosing the minimum patent breadth.jj
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